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I. INTRODUCTION
An appreciation of the international consequences of crime is
developing as a global concern of the new century. Leading examples of
transnational criminal activities include organized crime, weapons-grade
uranium smuggling, and narco-trafficking. This article questions whether
these and other "international crimes" can meet the legal definition of a
breach of international peace and security. The answer has dire
consequences, for if the actions of a private individual or group of
individuals are deemed to be a threat to international peace and security,
then the formidable powers of the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council
may be unleashed, to include the use of military force by the Member
States. The author suggests that as the Security Council expands the
definition of"a threat to" or "a breach of" international peace and security,
criminal acts committed by nonstate actors might meet this new and lesser
threshold.
This article focuses on questions concerning the consequences of
international crime, not from a judicial perspective, but from a security
viewpoint, that is, as a potential threat to international peace that could
trigger the use of force by Member states of the United Nations. This is to
distinguish from judicial issues raised by the proposed permanent
International Criminal Court (I.C.C.). This article examines concepts
connected with the right, under international law, of one or more nations
to use military force within the territorial boundaries of another sovereign
state. The author uses as illustrative examples the factual scenarios of
organized crime, weapons-grade uranium smuggling, and narco-trafficking
to explore the relevant international legal issues. However, these scenarios
are not meant to be exhaustive, nor does the author wish to suggest that
they are necessarily the most important crimes that threaten international
peace and security.
First, two key questions are addressed: What is meant by a threat to
international peace and security? What consequences result from a
determination that such a threat currently exists? Next, concepts of
international criminal law, traditional and current, are examined. The
article suggests that certain acts, which can be defined as crimes against the
international community, can trigger authorization by the Security Council
for the use of force against nonstate actors. Lastly, the author outlines
guiding principles to be used by the Security Council when deciding
whether to authorize the use of military force against international
criminals.
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II. WHAT CONSTITUTES A THREAT TO OR BREACH OF INTERNATIONAL
PEACE AND SECURITY?

The U.N. Charter has been established as the dominant international
legal paradigm concerning the use of force. Article 103 states that the
Charter supersedes all other international obligations: "In the event of a
conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations
under the present Charter and their obligations under any other
international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall
prevail.' '
As an initial note, the Charter establishes a general prohibition on the
use of force in Article 2(4): "All Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity. or political independence of any state, or in any other matter

inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."2 The first
"purpose" listed for the United Nations is "to maintain international peace
and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the

prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of
acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace."3 This open-ended
definition allows for the possible inclusion of individual international

criminal acts perpetrated by nonstate actors. In addition, the traditional
notion of the obligation to refrain from the threat to use force was intended

to apply only to states.4
The U.N. Charter contains four explicit exceptions to the Article 2(4)
prohibition on the use of force: (1) force used in self-defense, (2) force
authorized by the U.N. Security Council, (3) force undertaken by the five
permanent members prior to the Security Council being functional, and (4)
force used against "enemy" states from the Second World War.5 This
article specifically focuses on the use of force as authorized by the Security
Council.
The second exception is contained in Chapter VII of the Charter,
which addresses actions that are threats to the peace or breaches of the
peace, and acts of aggression, as found in Articles 39 through 51 6 Article

1. U.N. CHARTER art. 103.

2. Id.art. 2, para. 4.
3. Id.art. 1,para. 1.
4. See Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Defining Aggression, U.N.

GAOR, 7th Sess., Agenda Item 54, U.N. Doc. A/2211 (1952) [hereinafter Report on Defining
Aggression].
5. See ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT J. BECK. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF

FORCE: BEYOND THE UN CHARTER PARADIoM 31 (1993) (citing U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4)).
6. See id. (citing U.N. CHARTER ch. VII, arts. 39-51).
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39 empowers the Security Council to "'determine the existence of any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.' "" If the
Security Council determines that there has been such a threat to or breach
of the peace, then under Article 42 it may authorize members of the United
Nations to order the use of force."
The framers of the U.N. Charter did not provide a concise definition
of what constitutes a threat to or a breach of the peace.9 To date, neither
the U.N. Charter nor the General Assembly have defined these terms."°
This lack of a concrete definition of these concepts has resulted in
considerable confusion regarding their meaning." Scholars have wrestled
with the distinctions between "dangers" to the peace, "threats to the peace"
and "breaches of the peace."' 2 However, the Security Council has in
practice applied a "quite subjective" interpretation of their meaning.' 3
Consequently, the practices and communications of the Security Council
have not always been very enlightening on this point.'4
The author proposes a broader concept of a threat to the peace than
is found in the traditional definition of "aggression." "Aggression" was
defined by the General Assembly as "the use of armed force by a State
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of
another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the
United Nations, as set out in this Definition."'" Aggression was narrowly
viewed as related to an invasion, bombardment, blockade, and attack on
the land, sea, or air forces or the marine and air fleets of another state.' 6
Modem guidelines for making a determination of the existence of a
threat to the peace might include considerations of the scope and severity
of the resulting consequences, as well as evolving notions of state
7. Id. at 31-32 (quoting U.N. CHARTER art. 39).

8. See id at 32 (citing U.N. CHARTER art. 42). Article 39 further provides: "The Security
Council shall ... make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance
with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security." U.N. CHARTER
art. 39.
9. See AREND & BECK, supra note 5, at 48.
10. See Lois E. Fielding, Taking a Closer Look at Threats to Peace: The Power of the
Security Councilto Address HumanitarianCrises, 73 U. DET. MERCY L. REV.551, 560 (1996).
11. Seeid.at561.
12. See N.D. WHITE, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL
PEACE AND SECURITY 36-49 (1990); Ruth Gordon, United Nations Intervention in Internal
Conflicts: Iraq, Somalia,and Beyond, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 519, 562-68 (1994).
13. AREND & BECK, supranote 5, at 48.
14. See Gordon, supra note 12, at 567-68.

15. G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 19, Annex art. 1, U.N.Doc. A/9619
(1974).
16. See id. art. 3.
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sovereignty. The author suggests that crimes, perpetrated by nonstate
actors, that are transnational in character inherently involve egregious
threats of violence to persons and are beyond the ability or the will of the
domestic nation to control, may justify the authorization of the use of force
under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.
III. WHAT ARE THE RESULTS OF A DETERMINATION OF THE EXISTENCE

OF A THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY?

A determination of a threat to international peace and security is
solely within the province of the Security Council." Therefore, the
Security Council could determine that although not specifically mentioned,
international crime is a threat to the peace. Once the Security Council has
identified a threat to international peace and security, the Charter lays out
a framework for the authorization of force. Article 41 provides that the
Security Council may decide what measures, other than the use of armed
force, are to be used in carrying out its decisions."3 These measures may
"include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail,
sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and
the severance of diplomatic relations."' 9 Article 41 allows the Security
Council to impose the listed nonmilitary sanctions, but the Council is not
expressly confined to those mentioned."0
If the Security Council deems measures under Article 41 insufficient,
it may authorize military sanctions pursuant to Article 42.21 Under Article
42 these sanctions may involve "action[s] by air, sea, or land forces as may
be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security...
[such as] demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or
land forces of Members of the United Nations."2
Therefore, if the Security Council determines there is a "threat to the
peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression" as described in Article 39,
it has authority to act under either Article 41 or Article 42.23 The Council's
discretion in making such a determination is not limited, rather, it has wide
24
latitude under the U.N. Charter as a whole in coming to a judgment.

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

See U.N. CHARTER, art. 39, art. 12(l), respectively.
See id. art. 41.
Id.
See AREND & BECK, supra note 5, at 48 (citing U.N. CHARTER art 41).
See id.
U.N. CHARTER art. 42.
See Fielding, supranote 10, at 557.
See id
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Chapter VII powers were invoked in the Korean conflict, 25 peacekeeping
in the Middle East,26 the Congo 27 Cyprus, 28 Southern Rhodesia, 29 South
Africa,3" and Iraq." Furthermore, when the Security Council adopts a
resolution mandating an action, the order is binding on all members of the
United Nations, if unified action is necessary to carry out the task. 2
Although nonintervention as a concept is a fundamental principle of
international law, the scope of matters solely within the domestic
jurisdiction of a state appears to be shrinking while the definition of threats
to international peace and security is progressively broadening.
Specifically, the Charter prohibits the United Nations from intervening in
matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or from requiring

25. See LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 776-77 (2d ed. 1987). The United
Nations involvement in the Korean Conflict escalated when the Security Council adopted a
resolution at an emergency meeting determining that "the North Korean action constituted a breach
of the peace" and calling for "immediate cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the North
Korean units." Id. There were no negative votes on the Security Council, due in part to the fact
that the Soviet delegate was absent as a result of a dispute over the representation of China. See
id. at 777. When the Security Council convened on June 27, 1950, it stated that" 'urgent military
measures [weire required to restore international peace and security' "and recommended that" 'the
Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be
necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area."'
Id (quoting S.C. Res. 83, U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., 474 mtg., at 5, U.N. Doc. S.INF/4/Rev. 1 (1950)).
"This resolution had been the only collective security effort authorized under the Charter." Id.
26. See id. at 778-79. Peace-keeping operations were the result of the October 29, 1956,
invasion of Egypt by Israel in the continuing Middle East crisis. See id. at 778. On November 5,
1956, after a referral to the General Assembly by the Security Council, a resolution was established
that created a "'United Nations Command for an emergency international force to secure and
supervise the cessation of hostilities.'" Id (quoting G.A. Res. 1000, U.N. GAOR, First Emergency
Special Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/3354 (1956)).
27. See id. at 779-80. Shortly after Congo gained its independence, mutinies in the army and
attacks on Belgians forced Belgium to send military force for the "announced purpose of protecting
its nationals." Id The Security Council passed a resolution authorizing the Secretary General "'to
provide the Government [of the Republic of the Congo] with such military assistance as may be
necessary until, through the efforts of the Congolese Government with the technical assistance of
the United Nations, the national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the Government, to
fully meet their tasks."' Id. at 780 (quoting S.C. Res. 143, U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 873d mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/4387 (1960)).
28. See id. at 780-81.
29. See id. at 781-82.
30. See id. at 782.
3 1. See AREND & BECK, supra note 5, at 34.
32. See U.N. CHARTER art. 48, para. 1. Pursuant to Article 48, "the action required to carry
out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security
shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security
Council may determine." Id
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members to submit such matters to settlement under the Charter.33
However, the principle of nonintervention has been specifically established
so as notVII.
to 3 prejudice
the application of enforcement measures under
4
Chapter
Furthermore, some legal scholars have explicitly argued that there has
been a paradigmatic shift towards allowing the use of force beyond the
prohibitions of Article 2(4)." International lawyers have suggested that
this expansion in the definition of threats to international peace and
security includes the growing contention that human rights are no longer
solely within domestic jurisdiction,36 and that civil wars, intervention to
protect one state's nationals, and terrorism may legally trigger the
authorization and use of armed force. 3 Indeed, there are legal scholars
who argue that egregious human rights violations themselves amount to a
threat to international peace and security and consequently may lead to the
authorization of Chapter VII sanctions.3 S It might therefore follow that
international crime with its global implications could enter through the
door that human rights legal scholars have opened. It has been suggested
that "the ability of the Security Council to protect international peace and
security, whether the threat has direct or immediate trans-border effects or
not, whether the threat involves use of force or not, or whether [it is] a
newly recognized
threat, is witness to the flexibility of the language of the
39
U.N. Charter."

IV. CONCEPTS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW

A. TraditionalPosition
A prominent international scholar has defined international criminal
law as "the convergence of two disciplines: the penal aspects of
international law and the international aspects of national criminal law." °

33. See id. art. 2, para 7.
34. See id.
35. See AREND & BECK, supra note 5, at 40-45.
36. See id. at 132-36.
37. See id. at 82-86 (civil war), 94, 105-10 (nationals), 157-71 (terrorism).
38. See Fielding, supra note 10, at 555-56 (citing Thomas M. Franck, The Security Council
and "Threats to the Peace:" Some Remarks on Remarkable Recent Developments, in PEACEKEEPING AND PEACE-BUILDING: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROLE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL 83
(Rene-Jean Dupuy ed., 1992)).
39. Id. at 568.
40. JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 3 (1996) (citing M. Cherif

Bassiouni, An Appraisal ofthe Growth andDevelopingTrends of internationalCriminalLaw, 45
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International crimes also are known as delictijusgentium, that is, crimes
against humanity. 4' International crimes are created directly only by
international law, mostly through international agreements but additionally
through customary international law.42 This is to distinguish from merely
"transnational crimes, [which] need not be based in international law as
' Transnational crimes require a transnational element, international
such."43
44
crimes do not, although one or more may exist.
Currently, international criminal law is an area of active growth and
debate. The virtual revolution in this area is due in part to the recently
created ad hoc international tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for
Rwanda.45 Previously, the more traditional concepts of international
criminal law focused on state actors. 46 The International Law Commission
[.L.C.], while exploring international criminal issues during the 1970s,
stated that "[a]n act of a State which constitutes a breach of an
international obligation is an internationally wrongful act, regardless of the
subject matter of the obligation breached.4 7 Note that this statement
focuses on state acts. This focus is further illustrated by the I.L.C.'s
statement that "[a]n internationally wrongful act which results from the
breach by a State of an international obligation so essential for the
protection of fundamental interests of the international community that its
breach is recognized as a crime by that community as a whole, constitutes
an international crime."' The I.L.C. found that a breach was "serious"
when it involved an international obligation of essential importance. This
would include (1) maintaining international peace and security, for

REV. INT'L DE DROrr PENAL 405, 406 (1974)).

41. See id.
42. See id.
43. Id at 18. "International agreements and custom can be relevant to [transnational
criminal] issues concerning jurisdiction, enforcement, due process, judicial cooperation, [and] the
serving of sentences." Id.
44. See id As an example, "genocide committed by officials against groups of their own
people wholly within the territory of one country is an international offense even though no
transnational element exist[s]." Id. Other examples include slavery, apartheid, terrorism and other
crimes pertaining to human rights. See id.
45. For a discussion of the contributions of these tribunals to the creation of a permanent
international criminal court, see generally Daniel B. Pickard, Comment, Security Council
Resolution 808: A Step Towarda PermanentInternationalCriminalCourtfor the Prosecutionof
InternationalCrimes and Human Rights Violations, 25 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 435 (1995).
46. See id
47. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 533 (quoting InternationalLaw Commission Draft
Convention on State Responsibility, art. 19(1), I.L.C. REP. 175 (1976) [hereinafter State
Responsibility]).
48. Id.(quoting State Responsibility, supra note 47, art. 19(2)).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol12/iss1/1

8

Pickard: When Does Crime
Become
a Threat
to International Peace and Securi
INTERNATIONAL
PEACE
& SECURITY

example, prohibiting aggression; (2) protecting self-determination, for
example, prohibiting the "establishment or maintenance by force of
colonial domination;" (3) protecting human beings, for example,
prohibiting slavery, genocide, and apartheid; and (4) protecting and
preserving the environment, for example, prohibiting massive pollution of
the atmosphere or the oceans. 4 9
This is not to suggest that traditional concepts of international
criminal law exclude concepts of individual responsibility. The precedent
for assigning individual culpability for international crimes, such as crimes
against humanity, genocide, and crimes against the peace, has been frmnly
established since the International Military Tribunals following the Second
World War. ° However, those individuals who were accused in the
Nuremberg or Tokyo war crimes tribunals can safely be described as state
actors. They included government or military officials, or those who
collaborated with a governmental regime. This article, however, expands
the concept of individual responsibility to include individuals whose
actions are solely private.
Clearly, international scholars have recognized that breaches of
international obligations regarding peace and security can amount to
international crimes. However, the author suggests the inverse, that is,
international crimes themselves can rise to the level of a threat to, or a
breach of, international peace and security.
Traditional concepts of international criminal law take a weak view
of the consequences imposed for committing an international crime.
Article 14 of the "International Law Commission Draft on State
Responsibility" states:
(1) An international crime entails all the legal
consequences of an internationally wrongful act and, in
addition, such rights and obligations as are determined by the
applicable rules accepted by the international community as
a whole.
(2) An international crime committed by a State entails
an obligation for every other state:
(a) not to recognize as legal the situation created by
such crime, and,
(b) not to render aid or assistance to the state which
has committed such crime in maintaining the situation
created by such crime; and

49. Id. at 533-34 (quoting State Responsibility, supra note 47, art. 19(3)).
50. See Pickard, supra note 45, at 448-49.
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(c) to join other states in affording mutual assistance
in carrying out the obligations under subparagraphs (a)
and (b).5 '

B. CurrentDevelopments
There has been a resurgence of interest in matters relating to
international crime.52 One only has to look to the ad hoc tribunals currently
examining crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda as
evidence of this rebirth. These international criminal tribunals have the
jurisdiction to try crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide.53
Furthermore, negotiations for a permanent I.C.C. are underway. 4 The
United States, which has long been an opponent of an I.C.C., has recently
participated in the drafting of a constitutive charter." However, the current
analysis explores territory beyond concepts typically associated with
international crime. In fact, the current examination focuses on activities
that have passed the purely criminal realm and have entered the
extrajudicial realm of threats to international peace. Three activities that
constitute such a threat, namely weapons-grade uranium smuggling,
transnational organized crime, and narco-trafficking, provide an excellent
context to explore this phenomenon. These activities can be fairly argued

51. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 534 (quoting State Responsibility, supra note 47, art.
14(l)-(2)).
52. For a discussion of international criminal sentencing issues, see, generally Daniel B.
Pickard, Proposed Sentencing Guidelines for the International Criminal Court, 2 LOY. L.A. INT'L
& CoMP. L.J. 123 (1997).
53. See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 808:
Statute ofthe International Tribunal, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Annex, arts. 2-5, at 36-38, U.N. Doc.
S/25704/Annexes (1993) [hereinafter Resolution 8081. Specifically, the crimes that the
International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia is competent to hear are: (1) grave breaches of
the Geneva Conventions of 1949, (2) violations of the laws or customs of war, (3) genocide, and
(4) crimes against humanity. See id. See generally Paul J. Magnarella, Expanding the Frontiers
of Humanitarian Law: The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 9 FLA. J. INT'L L. 421
(1994) (discussing crimes covered by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda).
54. See Pickard, supra note 45, at 455; see also UN. International Law Commission, Report
of the Working Group on a Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, July 16, 1993, U.N.
GAOR 48th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 255-335, U.N. Doc. A/48/10, Annex, 33 1.L.M. 253, 258
(1994); Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, 49th Sess., Prov. Agenda Item 140, at
3, U.N. Doc. A/49/355 (1994).
55. See Report ofthe Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment ofan International Criminal
Court, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 22, U.N. Doc. A/50/22 (1995) [hereinafter Report ofthe Ad Hoc
Committee].
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to threaten national, regional, and perhaps global stability and in extreme
circumstances might cause the world powers to authorize the use of
military force to eliminate the threat.
This is not to imply that the Security Council should take the next
step and find that international crimes amount to a threat to international
peace. Rather, the threshold for Chapter VII determinations appears to be
lowering, and under current international law, criminal activity might meet
the criteria previously used to determine the existence of a threat to

international peace and security. The author suggests that lowering the
threshold may be legally justifiable as it would require a finding of a
breach of international security by the body authorized with making such
a decision and taking the steps necessary to remedy the situation.
The current analysis is a departure from traditional concepts of
international criminal law in at least two respects. First, it suggests an
expansion of the concept of international criminality beyond its historical
parameters of state responsibility and the responsibility of state actors, to
encompass nonstate actors, including private individuals. The second, and
more important distinction, concerns the consequences of international
criminal behavior. This article analyzes a response from governments that
goes beyond state obligations not to render aid or assistance and beyond
the creation of an international tribunal to prosecute parties guilty of
violations of international law. The article focuses on the possible
determination that the actions of a private individual or nonstate group
might be deemed a threat to international peace and security. Such a
determination, therefore, would allow the Security Council to authorize
force under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.
The author acknowledges that these are dangerous concepts. For
what is being discussed is the denial of legal protections provided by the
domestic laws of the accused. The due process protections that lie at the
heart of the administration of justice would effectively be ignored in the
interests of what some would say are political considerations. The author
suggests that this must only be done in the most extreme situations and in
cases where the criminal justice system of the domestic country has
completely failed. This consideration is explored further in the subsequent
discussion of suggested guidelines for a Security Council determination.
V.

THE CRIMES UTILIZED IN THE CURRENT ANALYSIS

Weapons-grade uranium smuggling, narco-trafficking, and organized
crime are employed in the current analysis as examples of types of criminal
behavior that could be considered a breach of international peace and
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security. 56 They are used as examples, in part, due to the severity of the
risks they pose and the fact that they might represent the next wave of
accepted international crimes. The current examination is a proposal for
a framework for defining acts that could be considered international crimes
and could meet the threshold for the authorization of Chapter VII powers."
The severity of the possible consequences of weapons-grade uranium
smuggling, narco-trafficking, and activities of organized crime should be
beyond question. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in December
1991, there has been great concern that the nuclear material from its
approximately 30,000 nuclear warheads remain safe. In August 1994,
German police seized twelve ounces of plutonium-239 in a Munich train
station.59 Although it is not definitely known, the materials most likely
came from Russian nuclear facilities.' Twelve ounces of plutonium-239
is almost enough material to create a nuclear bomb, is enough to poison a
city's water supply, and is enough to make a "dirty bomb" that would send
radioactive particles throughout the air.6' The threat posed by weaponsgrade uranium smuggling is further heightened by the recent increase in the
strength of Russian criminal syndicates.62 Organized crime is one of the
most dangerous international forces to arise from the fall the Soviet
Union. 63 Evidence exists that documents that organized crime has sought
access to nuclear stockpiles due to the potential for tremendous profit.64
Smuggling weapons-grade uranium might in fact be "the most significant
security threat to the West in the post-Cold war era." 5 This is not an
exclusive threat to the West, but impacts the peace and security of the

56. It is worth mentioning that there is no current international criminal code. See Pickard,
supranote 45, at 435 (discussing the evolution and failures associated with developing substantive
definitions of international crimes). There have been numerous drafts of such a code, however, and
the author would suggest that an international consensus has been established as to certain acts
which may be defined as "international crimes." See id. Included among these offenses are war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. See Report ofthe Ad Hoc Committee, supra note
55, paras. 54-61.
57. Some suggest that the requirement that the questioned behavior is, in fact, criminalized
under law. See infra part VI.
58. See Wendy L. Mirsky, Comment, The Link Between Russian Organized Crime and
Nuclear-Weapons Proliferation:FightingCrime and EnsuringInternationalSecurity, 16 U. PA.
J. INT'L Bus. L. 749, 750 (1995).
59. See id.at 751 & n.10 (citing Tom Masland, ForSale, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 29, 1994, at 30).
60. See id. at 751& n. 11.
61. Id. at 751 n. 10 (quoting Masland, supra note 59, at 30).

62. See id at 762 & n. 55.
63. See id.
at 751.
64. See id. at 752.

65. Id at 753.
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entire world. Additionally, developments at the Security Council have
shown that "under certain circumstances, the research, production, and
acquisition of materials or stockpiling of nuclear weapons, or other
weapons of mass destruction, may constitute a threat to international peace
and security."
The dangers inherent in narco-trafficking are also well known.
International narcotics trafficking is estimated to be a $500 billion-a-year
business, with profits second only to those of the arms trade and greater
than those of world trade in oil.67 Ninety-five percent of illegal drugs,
including all of the cocaine and heroin and most of the marijuana that is
consumed in the United States, originate overseas.6" Approximately sixtyfive percent of the total world's supply of illegal narcotics is consumed in
the United States.69 United States citizens spend more on drugs and drug
prevention, rehabilitation, and education than they spend on national
defense.70 Although the Security Council has not yet decided that
international narco-trafficking is a threat to the peace, illicit traffic in
narcotics is a crime under the U.N. "Draft Code of Crimes Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind."'" Furthermore, some international legal
scholars have determined that international narco-trafficking amounts to
a threat to the peace.72
Although terrorism has not been included in this article as an example
of an international criminal activity, the author does not intend to minimize
66. Fielding, supra note 10, at 568.
67. See Sharon A. Gardner, Comment, A Global Initiative to Deter Drug Trafficking: Will
Internationalizingthe Drug War Work?, 7 TEMP. INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 287, 287 n.5 (1993) (citing
Paul Lewis, DrugsPit Baker vs. Third Worldat UN., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1990, at A3); see also,
Arnaud de Borchgrave, TransnationalCrime Casts Huge Shadow over the Globe, WASH. TIMES,
Oct. 24, 1995, at A14 (stating that "international drug traffick[ing], money launder[ing] and
terroris[m] comprise the world's fastest growing business and the gravest national security
challenge the West has faced since the end of the Cold War").
68. See David P. Stewart, Internationalizingthe War on Drugs: The UN Convention Against
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and PsychotropicSubstances, 18 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 387,
388 n.3 (1990).
69. See id.
70. See Gardner, supra note 67, at 287 n.5 (citing Juan Carlos Parmerion, United States:
World Cooperation Key to Anti-Drug Campaign, Feb. 15, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Wires File).
71. See Fielding, supranote 10, at 567 (citing UN. InternationalLaw Commission Report
on the Draft Articles Adopted at Its Forty-ThirdSession: Draft Articles on the Draft Code of
CrimesAgainst the Peace and Security of Mankind, GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc.
A/26/405, 30 I.L.M. 1554, 1584, 1593 (1991)).
72. See id. (citing Yuri M. Kolosov, Limiting the Use ofForce: Self-Defense, Terrorism,and
Drug Trafficking, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 236 (Lori Fisler
Damrosch & David J. Scheffer eds., 1991)).
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the consequences of terrorism on international peace and security. The
Security Council has stated that "'the world-wide persistence of acts of
international terrorism in all its forms... [has] a deleterious effect on
international relations and [jeopardizes] the security of States.' ' '
Furthermore, the Security Council concluded that "' the suppression of
acts of international terrorism, including those in which States are directly
or indirectly involved, is essential for the maintenance of international
peace and security.' 74 However, the distinction between private and state
actors, and state complicity is especially confused in the context of
terrorism; therefore, terrorism has been excluded from the current
examination for the purity of the analysis.
VI. SUGGESTED FACTORS FOR DETERMINING WHEN CRIMINAL
BEHAVIOR IS A THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

What threshold would criminal behavior have to reach in order to
amount to a breach of international security? The author suggests several
factors to aid the Security Council in deciding whether criminal actions by
private actors amount to a threat to international peace and security.
A. TransnationalConsequences
In order to establish that criminal actions are a threat to international
peace and security, it must first be determined that the consequences of the

criminal behavior are transnational in character. This guideline appears to
be soundly within the past practices of the Security Council and within the
principles of the U.N. Charter. As stated above, Article 2 of the U.N.
Charter includes prohibitions on the use of force against the sovereign
territory of a nation, as well as on interference in matters that are strictly
within the domestic jurisdiction of a state. Therefore, an elementary
requirement to establish a breach of international peace should be that the
behavior examined has, or is likely to have, transnational consequences.
For example, as to weapons-grade uranium smuggling, it is
incontestable that the detonation of a weapon of mass destruction is highly
likely to have transnational consequences. Furthermore, it can be argued
that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction provokes regional

73. Id. at 566 (quoting S.C. Res. 731, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., Res. at 1, U.N. Doc S/INF/48
(1992), available in 31 I.L.M. 732 (1992)). The Security Council condemnation of terrorism was
a result of the Libyan governments failure to cooperate in investigating the destruction of Pan Am
flight 103. See id.
74. Id. at 568 (citing S.C. Res. 883, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Res. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/INF/49
(1993), available in 32 I.L.M. 1463 (1993)).
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instability. Similarly, the damage from a nuclear or radioactive weapon is
highly likely to include environmental harm that might be international in
nature.75 In addition, international organized crime and narco-trafficking
both have transnational characteristics.
For example, a criminal
organization can be involved in commerce with operations in two or more
countries, and the sale of illicit drugs from one country into another.
B. CriminalizedBehavior
The behavior that is in question and is before the Security Council
must be clearly criminalized under the law. The alleged criminal act
should be prohibited either under (1) international criminal law, or (2) a
majority of the criminal codes of the member nations of the United
Nations. As stated previously, an international criminal code does not
currently exist. However, there is a growing consensus that certain acts
clearly amount to violations of international criminal law, among these are
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.76 Indeed, many
nations currently are arguing strongly for an expansive list of substantive
crimes in regard to the proposed permanent I.C.C."
The U.N. Charter appears to support the argument that if an act is
criminalized under the majority of Member States' domestic laws, this
could create a defacto international prohibition. Article 38 of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice, which is annexed to the U.N. Charter,
states that one source of international law to be applied is "the general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations. ' Although "general
principles" as a source of international law might be argued as a more

75. See Fielding, supra note 10, at 567. The Draft Code of Crimes Against Peace and
Security of Mankind considers environmental crimes a threat to international peace and security.
See id Security Council Resolution 255 "'recognize[d] that aggression with nuclear weapons or

the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon state would create a situation in which
the Security Council, and above all its nuclear-weapon state permanent members, would have to
act immediately in accordance with their obligations under the U.N. Charter.'" Id, at 568
(alteration in the original) (quoting U.N. Doc. S.Res. 225 (1968)). This resolution clearly
emphasizes the threat that the proliferation of nuclear weapons pose. Fielding argues that "under
certain circumstances the research, production, and acquisition ofmaterials or stockpiling of nuclear
weapons.., of mass destruction, may constitute a threat to international peace and security." Id.
Fielding further acknowledges that the General Assembly has passed resolutions that state that the
use of nuclear weapons is contrary to the aim of the U.N. Charter. Id
76. See supratext accompanying notes 53-56.
77. See Report ofthe Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 55, at 11.
78. STATUTEOF THE INTERNATIONAL COURTOF JUSTICE, League ofNations Doc. C.80 M.28
(1936), available in I A COMPREHENSIVE HANDBOOK OF THE UNITEDNATIONS (Min-chuan Ku ed.,
1978) (annexed to the U.N. CHARTER).
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abstract source for concepts such as resjudicata,use of general principles
of law is a significant factor in determining international law. The fact that
an act is criminalized under the penal codes of the majority of Member
States can serve as a useful guideline for future Security Council decisions.
The underlying concern in criminalizing acts is to provide notice to
individuals who would be targeted by such Security Council resolutions.
Due process mandates that these individuals should not be punished for
actions that they could not clearly know were illegal when committed.79
Furthermore, the actions should be widely recognized as criminal in order
to diminish concerns regarding the political nature of the Security Council.
For example, if a majority of Member States were to recognize the targeted
act as illegal, it would be more difficult to characterize the Security
Council's Article 39 invocation as an abuse of discretion. As stated above,
legal theorists have argued that both narco-trafficking and the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction are contrary to current international law.
Furthermore, all three examples used for the present analysis would appear
to be criminalized under the majority of nation's criminal codes.
C. Refusal or Inability of the Home Nation to Address the
CriminalViolation
The arguments requiring the refusal or inability of a home nation to
address the criminal violation are related to the need for transnational
consequences as discussed above. Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter
establishes a domestic jurisdiction limitation, but this does not prejudice
Chapter VII actions.80 However, so as not to offend traditional notions of
sovereignty, the author argues that the home country must either be unable
to or refuse to address the criminal violation in question.
With regard to narco-trafficking, it is possible to argue that Columbia
is either a "narco-state" or a state that by omission or commission enables
the ongoing violation of international criminal law. Scholars have opined
that "Columbia has completely succumbed to this illicit trade," suggesting
that its economy depends on cocaine, that trafficking has corrupted the
government and led to internal violence, and that the state "is virtually
powerless to prevent the production and export of drugs."'" Similar
79. See Pickard, supra note 45, at 441-54 (reviewing the arguments concerning the lack of
international criminal law and concepts of nullen crimen sine lege and ex post facto prosecution).
80. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2(7).
81. Keith L. Sellen, The United NationsSecurity Council Veto in the New World Order, 138
MIL. L. REv.187, 197-98 (1992). Furthermore, international trafficking in narcotics can lead to
tension between exporting and importing countries, for example, between Columbia and the United
States, which in turn threatens international security. See id.
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comparisons can be made for the state of organized crime in Russia. Legal
authors have suggested that organized crime has actually bankrupted
Russia, "leading it closer and closer to anarchy." 2
Traditional notions of sovereignty would seem to dictate that the
international community may only act when the home country has
demonstrated that it cannot or will not address the ongoing violation. As
a caveat to the general prohibition against interference in the internal
matters of a state, some legal theorists have argued that the Security
Council can influence which matters fall within the domestic jurisdiction.
Interestingly, the Permanent Court of International Justice in the
Nationality Decrees case found that "'t]he question whether a certain
matter is or is not solely with the jurisdiction of a State is an essentially
relative question; it depends upon the development of international
relations.' ,,3 The author would therefore highlight the need of the
Security Council to exercise great care in this area in order to protect the
integrity and legitimacy of this process.
D. The Use of Forceor the Threat to Commit Violence
Criminal behavior that is to be determined a threat to international
security should either involve the use of force or amount to a threat of
committing violence to the person of another. This requirement is
intended to establish a minimum basis for the determination of the
existence of a breach of the peace. In defining the use of force, the author
borrows concepts included in the General Assembly's definition of
"aggression." In 1974, after years of debate, the General Assembly
adopted the "Definition of Aggression Resolution," which is not
technically binding on the Security Council or on Member States. u In
effect, the author proposes that the criminal behavior must affect the
territorial integrity, or political independence of another
sovereignty,
85
state.
The use or smuggling of a weapon of mass destruction would clearly
meet the requirement of a threat of violence that could affect the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of another nation.' Similarly, the often

82. See Sara Jankiewicz, Glasnost and the Growth ofGlobal OrganizedCrime, 18 Hous. J.
215, 260 (1995).
83. Fielding, supranote 10, at 559 (quoting LELAND M. GOODRICH ET AL., CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS 61 (3d ed. 1969) (quoting P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 4, at 24 (1922))).
84. See AREND & BECK, supra note 5, at 48.
85. See Report on Defining Aggression, supra note 4.
86. Arend and Beck note that "when the Charter was being drafted in the spring of 1945, the
delegates at San Francisco knew nothing of the nature and effects of nuclear weapons. It was not
INT'L L.
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violent and forcible ways in which organized criminals and narcotraffickers conduct their business invade and permeate the national
boundaries of importing countries.
As a related issue, the use of force to terminate the actions of
organized criminals or narco-traffickers might potentially be considered
justifiable as humanitarian intervention. Humanitarian intervention has
been defined as "the use of armed force by a state (or states) to protect
citizens of the target state from large-scale human rights violations.""7
Theories of humanitarian intervention have been used to justify the use of
force against both governmental and nongovernmentalactors."8 To justify
a humanitarian intervention "there must be within the target state an
'immediate and extensive threat to fundamental human rights, particularly
a threat of widespread loss of human life.' "s9 The requirements necessary
to justify a humanitarian intervention are equally applicable in this
analysis. Not only must a criminal act involve violence, but it must be
egregious to the extent that it merits intervention by the Security Council.
E. Extent of the Criminal Violation Must Be Egregious
As suggested above, not only should the criminal behavior be
transnational and involve the use of force or the threat of violence to
another, but for it to amount to an international threat, the extent of the
criminal violation must be egregious.
The precedent set by the Security Council in establishing what
constitutes "egregious" behavior creates a high threshold. Recent Security
Council practice in invoking Chapter VII, such as against "Iraq's
repression of minorities, genocide and brutal treatment of civilians in the
war in the former Yugoslavia, starvation of civilians in Somali, and
massive slaughter in Rwanda," indicates a willingness to act only in the
most extreme of cases. 9° However, the Security Council is willing to use
its discretion to address truly egregious acts where other elements required

for a determination of a threat to peace and security are only marginally
met. For example, the Security Council acted to alleviate the massive
human suffering in Somalia, which it deemed a threat to international
until August of that year, after the Charter had been signed, that the world became aware of the vast
destructive [powers of nuclear weapons. Therefore] the provisions of the Charter [which address]
the use of force did not [apply to] a nuclear world." AREND & BECK, supra note 5, at 38-39.
87. Id. at 113.
88. See id.
89. Id (quoting John Norton Moore, The Control of Foreign Intervention in Internal
Conflict, 9 VA. J. INT'L L. 205, 264 (1969)).
90. Fielding, supra note 10, at 551.
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peace and security, even though the event's transnational effects were
attenuated at best.9 In fact, some authors have suggested that a finding of
"'massive human suffering"' by the Security Council may by itself
constitute authorization of Chapter VII powers for the purpose of human
rights intervention.9"
Although the requirement that conduct be egregious would not be a
contentious issue as to the smuggling of weapons-grade uranium, it could
be problematic when applied to the extent of organized crime or narcotrafficking. Obviously, detonation of a weapon of mass destruction would
result in egregious consequences. A more factual determination and
detailed analysis would need to be made by the Security Council as to
whether the activities of a specific group of narco-traffickers or other
organized criminals amounted to an international threat to peace and
security. Some legal scholars have opined that currently there is no greater
security threat than that created by the drug trade.93 The U.N. Convention
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
acknowledges in its preamble that "illicit [drug] traffic generates large
financial profits and wealth enabling transnational criminal organizations
to penetrate, contaminate and corrupt the structures of government,
legitimate commercial and financial business, and society at all its
levels."" The author suggests that egregious criminal behavior can be
either an act committed once, such as the detonation of a weapon of mass
destruction, or a systematic and continuous act, such as the repeated
shipment of heroin into a sovereign state.
VII. LIMITING THE USE OF FORCE BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL
An analysis of the relevant factors for determining when there is a
threat to international peace should also incorporate consideration of the
extent of the force that may be authorized. Article 24 of the Charter states
that in fulfilling its primary responsibility, that is, maintaining international
peace and security, the Security Council must "act in accordance with the
[p]urposes and [p]rinciples of the United Nations." ' These purposes

91. See id. at 561.
92. Id at 562 (quoting Nancy D. Amison, InternationalLaw and Non-Intervention: When
Do HumanitarianConcerns Supersede Sovereignty?, 17 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 199, 207
(1993)).
93. See Sellen, supra note 81, at 197.
94. UnitedNations: ConventionAgainst Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs andPsychotropic
Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, pmbl., S. TREATY Doc. No. 101-4, 28 I.L.M. 493, 498 (1989).
95. U.N. CHARTER art. 24, para. 2.
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include not only the maintenance of international peace and security' but
also the development of friendly relations among nations97 and gaining
international cooperation to address international problems of an
economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian character.98 These principles
suggest that there are limitations on the extent of the use of force that can
be authorized by the Security Council. The author suggests that the use of
force must be limited by the principle of proportionality.
As described above, terrorist actions have been excluded from this
analysis for the purpose of determining when a criminal action may be
deemed to be a threat to international peace and security. However, an
analysis of state practice in response to terrorists acts might be helpful in
examining the issue of limitations on the use of force. Since the mid1960s state practice has regularly been directed against terrorist bases, as
opposed to terrorist-linked states." For example counter-base operations
averaged about one per year from 1969 to 1988. '0 Although not generally
viewed as in line with the U.N. Charter, counter-base operations have been
justified as consistent with the self-defense provisions of the Charter.'
There is a consensus among legal scholars that a nation's use of force
in response to terrorist acts must be proportionate. 2 The concept of
proportionality has been described variously as a response specifically tied
to a prior act of terrorism, or as a use of force proportional to "an
aggregation of past illegal acts.' 03 Another view, which the author
supports, is that the use of force is justifiable if it is "proportionate to the
overall terrorist threat faced by [a] state.""" This is known as a "deterrent
proportionality."' ' Since the purpose of a Security Council action would
be to prevent a breach of the peace or to restore international security, the
use of force should be authorized to the full extent necessary for deterrence
and must be in accordance with generally accepted humanitarian law.
It is important to note that authorization of force can result in military
operations against individuals, criminal sanctuaries, drug crops,
transportation vehicles, and command, control, and communications
centers, as well as strikes against weapons manufacturing facilities.
96. See id. art. 1, para. 1.
97. See id. art. 1, para. 2.
98. See id. art. 1, para. 3.
99. See AREND & BECK, supranote 5, at 153.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. Id. at 165.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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Furthermore, a Chapter VII determination by the Security Council could
entail the destruction of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapon systems
infrastructure, including production capabilities, storage facilities, and
delivery systems. These operations could very well be carried out without
the consent of the nations whose territorial boundaries are to be
compromised. Therefore, it appears prudent to acknowledge that
limitations on the use of force do and should exist. An appropriate balance
must be struck between a response sufficient to deter international criminal
activity and that which is narrowly tailored to respect international
humanitarian law and the sovereign rights of nations.
VIII. CONCLUSION

Great caution is required if the United Nations authorizes the use of
force against individuals who have committed international criminal acts.
However, certain private and criminalized acts that result in transnational
consequences, involve egregious threats of violence against individuals,
and cannot or will not be addressed within the appropriate domestic
jurisdiction could result in a legally definable threat to international peace
and security that would justify the use of military power. The author
argues that those guilty of proliferation of nuclear weapons for profit,
narco-trafficking, or evils of the same magnitude are no longer merely
criminals but have in fact declared war on the international community.
When it becomes necessary for the maintenance of international peace and
security, the Security Council should authorize the proportional use of
force to eradicate these blights.
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